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Unsponsored ADRs Falling Through
the Cracks: Adapting a Domestic
Securities Regime to a Global
Marketplace
ABSTRACT

Investing in the securities market has become a commonplace
activity for expert and amateur investors alike. As more and more
companies transcend national boundaries with their business
activities, investment in their securities becomes coveted by
international investors.
Since securities are regulated on a
country-by-country basis, it is unclear which law applies when conflict
arises. In an attempt to clarify one such situation, simplify the
applicationof US securities laws, and respect the legal regimes of other
nations, the Morrison decision created an unclear test which leaves
investors in unsponsoredAmerican Depositary Receipts (ADRs), one of
the most common international trading mechanisms, completely
unprotected by the laws of any securities regulatory regime. This Note
proposes using existing infrastructure to facilitate the trade of
unsponsored ADRs as a way to ensure both protection of investors and
efficiency of the global securities market.
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The US legal system is often critiqued for its failure to adapt to
the constant changes in technology in an efficient manner.1 While
troublesome in every industry or area of law, this shortcoming poses
particularly acute danger in the securities market, where the lack of a
functioning regulatory system stands to disrupt efficiency of the
market at a global level. This not only affects the multimillion-dollar
companies raising equity in the securities market, but also the
average people who seek to invest.
Despite the fact that the creators of the US securities
regulatory regime set out to establish a system that would both
protect investors and ensure an efficient market, 2 today's lawmakers
seem to have forgotten the importance of these overarching principles,
opting to treat securities transactions as though the market's
structure has not changed in the last eighty years. A market that was
once confined to domestic transactions strictly regulated by
mandatory disclosures and reporting requirements has transformed
into one that is fast-paced, global, and driven by technology,
containing mechanisms allowing uninformed investors to trade
without protection.
One particularly troubling mechanism is the unsponsored
American Depositary Receipt (ADR). Unsponsored ADRs allow US
investors to gain ownership in foreign companies through off-exchange

1.
Blair Janis, How Technology Is Changing the Practice of Law, GP SOLO, May/June
2014: Law Practice 20/20, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp-solo/2014/mayjune/
how-technology-changing-practice-law.html [https://perma.cc/DZ73-TRRG].
2.
See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N
(Oct. 1, 2013) http://www.sec.gov/aboutflaws.shtml [https://perma.cc/XWF4-YL4A [hereinafter
SEC]; Frederick H.C. Mazando, The Taxonomy of Global Securities: Is the U.S. Definition of a
Security Too Broad?, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 121, 133 (2012).
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transactions. 3
Unlike most traditional instruments, unsponsored
ADRs escape regulation of any country, leaving investors unprotected
from fraud by the issuing company.
This stands in stark contrast to the overarching goals of an
efficient US securities market with investor protections-and even its
creators' views on receipts in foreign companies. During a Senate
committee hearing in the promulgation of the Exchange Act of 1934,
the President of the New York Curb Exchange expressed the need for
4
protection of investors in foreign receipts specifically.
[Mly observation is that the American public has taken a sufficient burning in [these]
matters, and ought not have to again, and are entitled to a certain amount of honest
information and protection which ought to be given to them. I cannot yield to the point
5
that they are not given any protection.

Nonetheless, more than eighty years later, in a world where global
securities trade is as commonplace as domestic trade, these investors
are still not granted any protection, which endangers the securities
market on a global scale.
This Note examines the US legal system's struggle to adapt to
advancing technology and increasing globalization in the securities
market, particularly focusing on the trade of unsponsored ADRs. Part
I provides a brief background of the structure and function of the
securities market, its increasing globalization in recent years, and the
legislative and judicial response to a globalizing market. Part II
analyzes the implications and difficulties created by the static and
dated securities regulatory framework in today's rapidly changing
global marketplace. Part III advances three potential solutions using
the existing framework of the Depository Trust Company (DTC),
which currently exists as a holding company for both foreign and
domestic securities trading in the US market.

3.
BANKING

See Unsponsored ADRs, Market Review, DEUTSCHE BANK, GLOBAL TRANSACTION
(May

2015)

https://www.adr.db.com/drweb/public/en/docs/WhitepaperDepositary

ReceiptsUnsponsoredADRsMarketReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z55H-JLJJ].
4.
Note that the New York Curb Exchange is the previous name for what is known
today as the American Stock Exchange. See The American Stock Exchange Historical Timeline,
NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/American StockExchangeHistoricalTimeline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4FX-2XHA].
5.
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearingon S. 2963, H.R. 7852, H.R. 8720 Before the H.
Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 371 (1934) (statement of E. Burd Grubb,
President, NY Curb Exchange).
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BACKGROUND OF THE US SECURITIES REGULATORY REGIME AND ITS
RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION OF THE MARKET

A. Overview of the US Securities Market
While the US securities market has been in existence since the
nation's inception in 1776,6 its sophisticated and strict regulatory
regime did not take shape until the 1900s. 7 The Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") were enacted in the wake of the Great Depression.8 Through
mechanisms such as registration requirements, mandatory disclosure,
and antifraud provisions, these initial statutes sought to protect
investors and prevent abuses that could lead to financial crises. 9
Registration requirements and mandatory disclosures protect
investors by allowing them to make informed decisions when
purchasing securities. 10
Sanctions for fraudulent behavior allow
investors to trust that the information received from issuers is
reliable.1 1 Similarly, because information drives efficient prices in the
market, these mechanisms protect against abuses that could lead to
financial crises. 12 While a lack of information increases risk, leading
investors to discount the price of a security, sufficient information
allows for accurate pricing of a security in the market. 13 Therefore,
more information creates a more efficient market where issuing
14
companies can raise capital at lower costs.

More specifically, the Securities Act focuses on the regulation
of the primary securities market, setting forth the registration
requirements, disclosure requirements, and causes of action for
misrepresentation. 15
Meanwhile, the Exchange Act is more

6.
See Brian Murphy, The Rise of an American Institution: The Stock Market, THE
GILDER LEHRMAN INS. OF AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/economics/
essays/rise-american-institution-stock- market [https://perma.cc/SPK7- 9YDC].
7.
See Mazando, supra note 2, at 131-32.
8.
See id.
9.
See SEC, supra note 2; Mazando, supra note 2, at 133.
10.
See SEC, supra note 2.
11.
See id.
12.
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on S. 2963, H.R. 7852, H.R. 8720 Before the H.
Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 783 (1934) (statement of Evans Clark,
Director, Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.).
13.
See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75Year-Old Sec, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 962 (2009).
14.
See id. at 953-54.
15.
SEC, supra note 2. The primary securities market encompasses sales of securities
directly from issuing companies to the first investors, while the secondary market encompasses
all subsequent sales of securities between investors. See Vincent M. Chiappini, How American
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expansive-regulating the secondary securities market, creating the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and granting the SEC
16
broad authority to derive and enforce rules.
Among the many provisions promulgated by these original
statutes, one of the most important, influential, and daunting for
issuers and investors alike is the antifraud provision of the Exchange
Act found in Section 10(b). 17 Section 10(b) grants a broad delegation of
authority to the SEC to regulate the use of deceptive devices "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered."1 8 For
years, the text of Section 10(b) and its legislative history have been
interpreted to imply that the antifraud provision applies regardless of
whether securities are traded on organized US markets. 19
Accompanying Section 10(b) is SEC Rule 10b-5, a similarly expansive
rule creating a cause of action for fraudulent or deceptive behavior in
the exchange of securities. 20 It has become the primary mechanism
used by shareholders who wish to bring action alleging fraud against
21
issuers.
In the almost eighty years since these statutes were enacted,
little has changed in the law, but much has changed with regard to
the method of buying and selling securities. 22 For many years,
securities transactions were purely paper-based; 23 transferring stock
required the buyer to send the seller a check and the seller to mail the
purchased stock certificates to the buyer. 24 With time, securities
market traffic increased to a level that made manual transactions
unfeasible, and in 1975, Congress passed legislation aimed at
remedying these problems by centralizing the storage of stock
certificates and ceasing to require physical movement in the
effectuation of trades. 25 The brokerage industry took charge of

Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs, Rule 1Ob-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1795, 1797-98 (2011).
16.
See Chiappini, supra note 15, at 1798.
17.

15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2012).

See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
18.
ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 541 (2011).
See Leaseco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir.
19.
1972); Beyea, supra note 18, at 541.
20.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 541.

21.
See id. at 540.
See Cox, supra note 13, at 942; James W. Christian, Robert Shapiro, John-Paul
22.
Whalen, Naked Short Selling: How Exposed Are Investors, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1047-48
(2006).
See Cox, supra note 13, at 942.
23.
24.

See Christian, supra note 22, at 1047.

25.

15 U.S.C. §78q-l(a) (2012); Christian, supra note 22, at 1047.
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immobilizing and centralizing stock certificates through the creation
of the Depository Trust Company (DTC) in 1973.26 The DTC holds
physical stock certificates representing actual market shares in its
vaults and records sales by crediting investors' accounts. 27 This allows
for purely electronic exchanges in the securities market through
trades tracked by book entries in participant's DTC accounts. 28 In
1975, the DTC began servicing ADRs, reaching into the global
marketplace. 29 Over the years, the DTC, now a subsidiary to the
larger Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC), has become so
prominent that it services more than fifty exchanges and equity
trading platforms in the United States in addition to securities in 131
countries.30
B. Globalizationof Securities Market
Advancements in technology have inevitably led to an
interconnectedness of economies around the world. 31 The securities
industry is no exception, as more and more companies seek to sell
their securities in foreign markets. 32 The US market is particularly
attractive to these companies for a variety of reasons. First, as
mentioned, the strict regulatory regime increases trust in potential
investors' minds and reduces the likelihood that investors will
dramatically discount the price of a given security to account for a lack
of information or other risks. 33 Therefore, by listing on the US
market, foreign companies can raise capital at a lower price and
increase the potential for financial gains. 34 Second, foreign companies
choose to enter the US market to expand the pool of potential capital
and investors and increase the liquidity of their shares, which leads to
higher expected returns. 35 Third, placing securities on the US market

26.
See Christian, supra note 22, at 1050; DTCC, Securing Today. Shaping Tomorrow.,
4 [hereinafter DTCC, Securing Today], http://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/Downloads/About/
DTCCCapabilities.pdfla=en [https://perma.ccfM47P-APU6].
27.
See Christian, supra note 22, at 1050.
28.
See id. at 1050-51.
29.
DTCC Digital Museum, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/annuals/museumJindex.html
[https://perma.c/5EMK-PZUS].
30.
See DTCC, Securing Today, supra note 26, at 3.
31.
See International Investing, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM. (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm [https://perma.cc/DR8D-LQ6K].
32.
Id.
33.
Cox, supra note 13, at 953-54.
34.
Amir N. Licht, Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141,
144 (2003); Pierpaolo Marano, Cross-listing, Global Shares and Dematerialised Shares, 11
UNIFORM L. REV. 267, 267 (2006).

35.

See Licht, supra note 34, at 144.
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can increase a foreign company's visibility and marketing
capabilities. 36 Finally, listing securities on the US exchange increases
a foreign company's success in effecting mergers and acquisitions,
tender offers, and stock swaps with US companies. 37 Some argue that
these attractive features of the US regime have influenced the
securities regulations in other countries, closing the gap between the
strictness of US regulations and foreign regulations and making the
global market more efficient, transparent, and trustworthy as a
38
whole.
On the other hand, some argue that this strict regulatory
regime actually works as a deterrent to foreign companies' entry to the
market. 39 Despite the clear advantages of listing on the US market,
there are also several disadvantages. First, registering on the US
market is extremely expensive, requiring hundreds of thousands of
dollars in direct fees in addition to costs associated with paying
managers, underwriters, lawyers, accountants, printing fees, and fees
for potential legal liability. 40 Second, the reporting requirements are
difficult to comply with and expose companies to litigation. 41 Third,
extensive reporting requirements require disclosing information to the
public, regulators, and even competitors for free. 42 Finally, there are
43
cheaper and less complicated alternatives in the private market.
Despite these deterrents, many foreign companies seek to trade
on US exchanges and have several modes of entry in order to do so.
Most traditionally, they have the option of directly listing their
securities on the US exchange, voluntarily subjecting themselves to
the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act of 1934, and all other
SEC requirements and regulations.
There are substitute methods used by foreign companies to
reach US investors that are less direct and allow these companies to
bypass the strict and extensive regulations required for an ordinary
listing. One alternative method is to use an American Depositary

36.
Id. at 145.
37.
Id.
38.
See Cox, supra note 13, at 984-86; see also Licht, supra note 34, at 142.
39.
See Marano, supra note 34, at 267.
40.
Licht, supra note 34, at 143.
41.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b) (2012) (sets base fee payable to SEC for processing of a
registration statement); Brian R. Davis, Securities Regulation: Pyramid Promotion of
Self-Improvement Courses Involves Sale of Investment Contracts Within Coverage of Federal
Securities Laws. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), 51 TEX.
L. REV. 788, 802-03 (1973).

42.
43.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78a-pp (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.500.
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Receipt program. 44 ADR programs involve the placement of foreign
shares into depositary banks where the securities are converted into
negotiable certificates that represent an interest in shares of the
foreign company. 45 These certificates are called American Depositary
Receipts and are sold to interested US investors. 46 These programs
simplify the process of investing in foreign securities for US investors,
47
allowing them to trade in US dollars rather than in foreign currency.
There are two general types of ADR programs-sponsored and
unsponsored-which differ based upon the degree of involvement by
the foreign company. 48 With sponsored ADR programs, the foreign
company has a clear intent to enter the US market through an ADR
program, and it retains the ability to exercise control over the
program. 49 Sponsored programs are established through contractual
agreements between the foreign company and a single depositary
bank. 50 The company has control over terms and conditions of the
ADR program, such as the number of registered ADRs, organization of
recordkeeping, rights of shareholders, shareholder communications,
and payment of dividends. 5 1 Sponsored ADRs may list on national
exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, or on over-the52
counter (OTC) markets, explained in detail below.
On the other hand, unsponsored ADR programs are created
53
and managed with absolutely no cooperation by the foreign company.
Instead, broker-dealers establish these programs in response to
perceived investor demand using a Form F-6 to register the ADRs
with the SEC. Not only do these arrangements involve no legal
relationship between the depositary bank and the issuer, no costs to
the issuer, and no requirements that the issuer comply with
Sarbanes-Oxley or GAAP Principles, the foreign issuer often does not
44.
See generally MATTHEW D. BERSANI ET AL., ADR PROGRAMS: IMPACT OF
UNSPONSORED PROGRAMS ON NON-US ISSUERS (2009), http://www.shearman.com/-/media/

Files/Newslnsights/Publications/2009/03/ADR-Programs-Impact-of-Unsponsored -Programs-onN_/Files/Click-here-to-view-article-ADR-Programs-Impact-o
/FileAttachment/CM040209
ADRProgramslmpactofUnsponsoredProgramson
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFN-2U6G].
45.
SEC OFFICE OF INV'R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN: AMERICAN
DEPOSITARY
RECEIPTS
1
(2012),
http://www. sec.gov/investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R66Y-UE2K] [hereinafter INVESTOR BULLETIN].

46.
47.

See id.
See id.

48.
49.

See BERSANI, supra note 44, at 1.
See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 45, at 1-2.

50.
See id.
51.
See id.; BERSANI, supra note 44, at 1.
52.
See Am. Depositary Receipts, Release No. 274 (May 23, 1991); Yuliya Guseva,
Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital: Another Look at the Efficiency and
Extraterritorialityof Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 411, 427 (2013).
53.
See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 45, at 2.
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even know that its shares are being traded in the United States as
ADRs. 54 This lack of control by foreign companies and the informality
of this system allow multiple depositary institutions to create
programs with inconsistent shareholder services that the foreign
private issuers are unable to influence. 5 As a result, unsponsored
programs create huge risks of investor confusion and a lack of
sufficient investor protection. 56 The investor protection issues are only
exacerbated by another aspect of Form F-6, which allows depositary
institutions to create a fictitious "issuer" of these ADRs, whose role is
57
purely ministerial.
Unsponsored ADRs also differ from sponsored ADRs in that
they cannot trade on national securities exchanges, such as the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. 58 Instead,
they must be bought and sold on what are referred to as the OTC
market. 59 The OTC market typically houses those securities that
cannot meet the requirements necessary for trading on national
exchanges. 60 Therefore, these securities are more risky, their prices
are less efficient, and their protection under securities laws is minimal
or nonexistent. 61 Due to the inherent risks associated with purchases
of securities on OTC markets, 62 purchasers attempting to seek relief
under Rule 10b-5 often fail to meet the required presumption of
reliance.63

However, unsponsored ADRs vary drastically from those
securities that typically trade on the OTC market. Unlike the small,
risky companies that trade on the OTC market because they cannot
meet registration requirements, Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) with
unsponsored ADRs on the OTC market are typically as large and
established as the US companies trading on national exchanges.6 4

54.
See DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 3, at 3.
55.
See BERSANI, supra note 44, at 1.
56.
See id.
57.
See Mark A. Saunders, American Depositary Receipts: An Introduction to U.S.
CapitalMarkets for ForeignCompanies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48, 66 (1993).
58.
Am. Depositary Receipts, Release No. 274 (May 23, 1991); see Guseva, supra note
52, at 427.
59.
See DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 3, at 3.
60.
Randall Dodd, Markets: Exchange or Over-the-Counter, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/markets.htm [https://perma.cc/M2YM-KAZS].
61.
See id.; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1173, 1248 (2012).
62.
Lucy McKinstry, Regulating a Global Market: The Extraterritorial Challenge of
Dodd-Frank's Margin Requirements for Uncleared Otc Derivatives & a Mutual Recognition
Solution, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 776, 788-94 (2013).
63.
See Fox, supra note 61, at 1247.
64.
See id. at 1248.
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Also, shares of FPIs are well established with efficient prices on their
home markets and matching prices in other markets they have
volitionally entered due to cross-market arbitraging. 65 Therefore,
when brought to the US OTC market through depositary trust
companies in the form of unsponsored ADRs, they are traded at
roughly the same price, making them almost as efficient as companies
66
on national exchanges.
Recent regulatory amendments have facilitated an increase in
the creation of unsponsored ADR programs. 67 Under Exchange Act
Section 12(g), certain registration and disclosure requirements are
triggered when a company has three hundred or more US
shareholders.6 8 This is especially concerning for foreign companies
whose US shareholder base may be established through unsponsored
ADRs over which they have little to no control. 69
Therefore,
previously, in order for foreign companies to be exempted from
automatic disclosure and registration requirements, foreign
companies had to formally apply for an exemption by submitting
required documents under Rule 12g3-2(b). 70
However, recent
amendments to Rule 12g3-2(b) allow for the exemption to be met less
formally and without any action by the company. 71 The amended Rule
deems companies exempt so long as sufficient information is included
on its company website. 72 Form F-6 was accordingly amended,
allowing certain unsponsored ADR filing requirements to be satisfied
so long as depositary banks relied in good faith on the adequacy of
information on a company's website under amended Rule 12g3-2(b). 73
Although these amendments sought to create a positive
effect-such as increasing trade of foreign securities in the United
States-they create several potentially negative consequences. 74 For
instance, the good faith requirement seems to dramatically decrease
65.
See id.
66.
See id. Note that several years after the Securities and Exchange Acts were passed,
the SEC felt that the value of an ADR on the domestic market should match its value in the
foreign market. Compare Am. Depositary Receipts Representing Ordinary Stock of Cable &
Wireless (Holding) Ltd., 37 Fed. Reg. 2452 (Aug. 2, 1937) (rejecting application of an ADR
security where the receipt was not "substantially equivalent" to the value of the share overseas),
with In re Am. Depositary Receipts Representing Ordinary Registered Shares of The De
Havilland Aircraft Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Aug. 31 1937) (approving application of an ADR
security where its value was shown to be substantially equivalent to the underlying share).
67.
See BERSANI, supra note 44.
68.
See id.
69.
See id.
70.
See id.
71.
See id.
72.
See id.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
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the amount of information required by a particular company and fails
to ensure that information's legitimacy. This lowers the regulatory
bar, putting investors in a riskier position than they expect when
trading on the US market. This conflicts with the legislative history
of the 1934 Exchange Act discussing ADRs, which expresses an
interest in protecting Americans investing in ADRs through access to
75
adequate and accurate amounts of information.
C. Globalizationand ExtraterritorialityAddressed
1. Legislative Perspective
Despite a clear desire for the SEC to have expansive oversight
over all securities, including those on OTC markets, 76 Congress
recognized a need to avoid oversight that could disrupt domestic
trading, complicate existing regulatory regimes, or impose regulations
on foreign issuers who did not voluntarily enter the United States to
raise capital. 77 Therefore, Congress granted the SEC authority to
exempt foreign securities, partially or completely, so long as "the
exemption [wa]s in the public interest and consistent with the
78
protection of investors.
The SEC utilized this authority first by choosing to exempt
ADRs from the 1964 Amendments to both the Securities and
Exchange Acts, which expanded reporting and registration
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on S. 2963, H.R. 7852, H.R. 8720 Before the H.
75.
Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 371 (1934) (statement of E. Burd Grubb,
President, NY Curb Exchange) ("It is inconceivable that the companies whose stocks are thus
held in the form of receipts in this country would file the information required by the bill, or any
information.... Do you not think the American public is entitled to a little better information for
its protection than it has had with reference to dealing with bonds and stocks. . . . [Your
argument is that you should do nothing with reference to foreign stocks or bonds. But my
observation is that the American public has taken a sufficient burning in those matters, and
ought not to have to again, and are entitled to a certain amount of honest information and
protection which ought to be given to them. I cannot yield to the point that they are not given
any protection.").
76.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2012) (covering "any security not so registered"); Superintendent
of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 (1971) ("For 10(b) bans the use
of any deceptive device in the 'sale' of any security by 'any person.' And the fact that the
transaction is not conducted through a securities exchange or an organized over-the-counter
market is irrelevant to the coverage of s 10(b).').
77.
See S. Rep. No. 379 at 29-31 ("As a practical matter, however, enforcement of the
registration and reporting requirements of S. 1642 against foreign issuers outside the
jurisdiction of the United States who do not voluntarily seek funds in the American capital
markets or listing on an exchange would present serious difficulties. To prevent the securities of
such issuers from being traded in the U.S. markets would seriously affect American holders of
millions of dollars of such foreign securities.").
Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066
78.
(Apr. 28, 1967).
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requirements. The SEC reasoned that ADRs are not securities within
themselves, but rather represent an interest in an underlying security
over which the SEC has limited control and investors would not be
provided new or novel information if ADRs were registered. However,
these securities are not totally unregulated, as Exchange Act 12(g)
kicks in when a company has three hundred or more US shareholders.
However, this exemption has interesting implications with
regard to unsponsored ADRs traded over-the-counter. The SEC has
consistently exhibited reluctance in specifying how and which SEC
rules apply to unsponsored ADRs. For instance, Rule 12(g)(3) states
that FPIs who have previously listed securities on US exchanges are
subject "to the provisions of sections 14 and 10 of the Act."7 9 Over
time, similar uses of rulemaking silence with regard to unlisted FPIs,
or instances where rulemakers spoke only with regard to FPIs
registered on US exchanges, have been used to distinguish FPIs that
have listed from those that have never listed on an established
80
national exchange.
2. Judicial Perspective
With securities trading globally in a world with increasingly
integrated financial markets, there has been a steady increase in both
transnational securities fraud and transnational securities fraud
litigation.8 1
However, since each country has its own unique
regulatory scheme, it can be difficult to determine which country's
regulatory scheme applies in a particular transaction.8 2 In addition,
one country's regulatory scheme may be more attractive than
another's.8 3 Since the US regime is often viewed as most attractive to
investors, this leads to a relentless attempt by defrauded investors
around the world to bring Rule 10b-5 actions within the United States,
even when the transaction in question has little or no connection to
84
the United States.

79.
Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066
(Apr. 28, 1967) (codified in Rule 12g3-2(b)).
80.
See e.g., '08 SEC Rule (codified in 17 C.F.R. § 239) (failing to discuss the issue of
antifraud with regard to FPIs' securities intended for non-US market trade that ended up
trading on the OTC market); Offshore Offers and Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306-01 (May 2, 1990)
(codified in 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015)) (establishing that antifraud provisions applied to securities
intentionally sold into the United States).
81.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 539.
82.
Samuel Wolff, Extraterritoriality and the Securities Laws: Post-Morrison
Developments, 34 NO. 9 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 1 (2012).

83.
84.

See id.
See id.
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US courts recognized the increased likelihood for transnational
security fraud and were tasked with creating rules to mitigate this
problem without any clear Congressional guidance.8 5 Using policy
considerations and their best judgment, courts generally agreed that
Congress "would not have wanted wrongdoers offshore to be free to
cause harm in the United States, or for the United States to be used
as a base for fraudulent schemes directed at foreigners, even if the
actual transaction affected by the fraud took place overseas."8 6 As a
result of this consensus, two tests dominated transnational securities
fraud jurisprudence for many years: the conduct test and the effects
test.87

The conduct test focused "on the nature of [the] conduct within
the United States as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent
scheme."88 In promulgating this test, courts inferred that Congress
wanted to deter issuers from choosing the United States as a platform
for defrauding investors.8 9 In applying this test, circuit courts adopted
a variety of methods for determining what conduct was sufficient to
bring the action within the purview of Rule 10b-5. 90
Meanwhile, the effects test asked whether fraudulent foreign
actions "caused foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the
United States." 91 These interests included US investors, US markets,
and securities traded on US exchanges or issued by its entities. 92
Despite the widespread use of these two tests among the judicial
circuits, for over forty years, each faced criticism for requiring
extremely fact-specific inquiries that resulted in unpredictable
outcomes. 93 This led to pressure to move toward a more bright-line
test, which the Supreme Court sought to enact with its 2010 decision

85.
See Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N 10 (2012) [hereinafter
SEC Study].
86.

See id.

87.
See id.; Beyea, supra note 18, at 542.
88.
See SEC Study, supra note 85, at 11 (quoting Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722
F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983)).
89.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 543.
90.

See SEC Study, supra note 85, at 11.

91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.; Beyea, supra note 18, at 542.
See Christina M. Corcoran, The Post-Morrison Challenge-The Growing Irrelevance

of a Transaction-Based Test in an Interconnected World: An Analysis of the Extraterritorial

Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the InternationalComity
Implications in the Wake of Morrison, 26 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 77, 77 (2013); Grant Swanson, A
Comparative Law Analysis of Private Securities Litigation in the Wake of Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967 (2012).
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Morrison v. NAB. 94 This bright-line test establishes the current state
of the law. 95
The Morrison case involved what is classified as a
"foreign-cubed" action, meaning it involved foreign plaintiffs suing
foreign defendants for misconduct in connection with securities
trading on foreign exchanges. 96 More specifically, the case involved
Australian investors who purchased Australian Common Stock from
an Australia-based company that also owned a Florida-based
company.9 7 The investors brought a claim under Rule 10b-5 on the
grounds that fraudulent bookkeeping occurred within the Florida
company, causing a decrease in the share price of the investor's
Australian shares.9 8 Therefore, the case's only connection to the
United States was that the alleged deceptive conduct occurred in
Florida. 99
The Court held that the SEC's jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5 is
not dependent on the place where the alleged deception originated, but
is limited to "transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges
and domestic transactions in other securities." 10 0 Therefore, Morrison
set forth a new two-pronged, transaction-based approach asking
whether the transaction was (1) listed on a domestic exchange or (2) a
domestic transaction in other securities. 10 1 In creating this test, the
Court sought to promote predictability, international comity, and
preservation of the language of the Exchange Act.10 2 In support of the
first prong of the test, it reasoned that transactions conducted on
domestic exchanges and OTC markets affected a national public
interest, whereas transactions on foreign exchanges did not.10 3
However, the Court provided no clarification as to the meaning of
"other securities" in the second prong, or how this aspect of the
10 4
purported test was to be applied.
The
Court stressed
that the presumption
against
extraterritoriality applies in all cases. 10 5
It stated that this

94.
Rule 10b-5
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Vincent M. Chiappini, How American Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs,
Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1795, 1822 (2011).
Morrison v. NAB, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 538.
See Morrison,561 U.S. at 251.
See id. at 251-53.
See id. at 250-53.
Id. at 266-67.
Id.
See Chiappini, supra note 94, at 1822.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
See McKinstry, supra note 62, at 812.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.

2016] UNSPONSORED ADRs FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS

863

presumption is not rebutted by the definition of interstate commerce,
which includes "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication
between any foreign country," nor by the section of the Securities
Exchange Act dealing with actions abroad that might conceal a
domestic violation. 10 6 As a result, the Court deemed the foreign-cubed
10 7
transaction at issue outside the purview of SEC Rule 10b-5.
D. The Aftermath of Morrison
The legislature responded quickly to Morrison's plea for
legislative guidance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank").1 08 Section 929P(b)(2) of Title
IX of Dodd-Frank essentially allows US district courts to continue to
apply the conducts and effects tests in SEC and Department of Justice
(DOJ) enforcement actions.10 9 However, its guidance only pertains to
the governmental actions just described. The Act is silent with regard
to private causes of action brought by individual investor plaintiffs,
leaving Morrison as the controlling law.
From a judicial standpoint, the Court's attempt in Morrison to
clarify the reach of Rule 10b-5 liability with its transactional test
instead created a very specific rule that left many questions
unanswered. 110 In addition, the Court seemed to ignore the increasing
interconnectedness of the world's financial markets. 1 What is clear
from the Morrison opinion is a desire by the Court to significantly
reduce the ability of plaintiffs to bring Rule 10b-5 actions with foreign
elements in US federal court. 11 2 However, the Morrison decision dealt
specifically with Rule 10b-5 liability in a foreign-cubed situation
involving actual securities and employed broad and vague language in
establishing a rule. Therefore, lower courts were left with little to no
106.
Id. at 262-64.
107.
Id. at 264-65.
108.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West 2000 & Supp. 2011))
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; Corcoran, supra note 93, at 79-80.
109.
Dodd-Frank, supra note 108 ("EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.-The
district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United
States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title involving-(1) conduct within
the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2)
conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States.").
110.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 539-40.
Ill.
See id. at 554.
112.
See David He, Beyond Securities Fraud: The TerritorialReach of U.S. Laws After
Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 152 (2013).
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guidance on how to approach cases involving transactions with
different foreign elements. Not to mention the fact that in a modern,
electronic, and technologically advanced world where borders are
effectively seamless, it is often difficult or impossible to define a
' 113
"domestic transaction."
In cases dealing with purchases on foreign exchanges, district
courts have predominantly, if not exclusively, dismissed these claims
as foreign transactions.1 14 In Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., a
particularly influential California district court case, the court
interpreted a purchase of a security on a foreign exchange as if "the
purchaser or seller ha[d] figuratively traveled to that foreign
exchange-presumably via a foreign broker-to complete the
transaction."' 115 The physical location of the investor while the
transaction took place was deemed irrelevant.1 16 In the In re Alstom
case, investors purchased securities from a French company that duallisted its securities on the Euronext exchange and the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) in the United States. 11 7 Even though the securities
were technically "listed on a domestic exchange," the court held that
the clear focus of Morrison and, more broadly, the Exchange Act was
118
the location where the transaction took place.
Attempts to determine Morrison's applicability to ADRs has
resulted in confusion and inconsistency.
Some courts have
approached the issue by deeming ADRs purchases as domestic
transactions under Morrison because they are listed and traded on
domestic exchanges.11 9 Other courts look at the economic realities of
individual transactions, with different courts reaching different
results. 120 In viewing the economic realities of ADR transactions,
several courts noted that purchases and sales of ADRs could be
considered domestic transactions without actually deciding the
issue. 121 Meanwhile, others have held that the mere listing of ADRs

113.
See Wolff, supra note 82.
114.
See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624-26 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
115.
Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010).
116.
See id.
117.
See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); He,
supra note 112, at 174-75.
118.
See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73.
119.
See Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1-2.
120.
See Christopher Calfee, Can't See the Forest for the Trees: Where Does a Purchaseor
Sale of Securities Occur?, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153, 170 (2012).
121.
See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
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on the US exchange is insufficient to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability when
the actual trade occurs on a foreign exchange. For example, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York took an especially
narrow approach in In re Societe Generale Securities Litigation,which
involved purchases of unlisted ADRs on the OTC market. 122 The court
held that ADR transactions were 'predominantly foreign securities
transactions" because they represent trading in foreign securities and
are "traded in a less formal market with lower exposure to USresident buyers. ' 123 While the general trend of courts seems to be
classifying ADR claims as foreign, this line of cases exhibits no
consistency in outcomes or reasoning, leaving investors and foreign
companies uncertain whether US courts have jurisdiction over ADR
claims under the Morrison test.
Similarly,
determining
applicability
to
off-exchange
transactions has posed an increasingly difficult task for lower courts,
as the only pertinent guidance from Morrison is the second part of its
holding pertaining to "domestic transactions in other securities." As
mentioned the Morrison Court itself provided no guidance as to the
interpretation of this prong of its test. 124 Courts have taken several
approaches, specifically: the economic realities approach, 25 the
irrevocable liability approach, 126 and the transfer of title approach.1 27
Due to the variety of approaches and different courts interpretations
of how to apply them, predictability is difficult for investors and
issuers alike. The irrevocable liability approach is likely the most
egregious of the three, requiring courts to determine the moment at
which the investor has "incurred an irrevocable liability to take and
pay for the stock."1 28 If that moment occurs in the United States, the
transaction is subject to Rule 10b-5.1 29

122.
See e.g., In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 C1V. 2495 (RMB), 2010 WL
3910286, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
123.
See id. at *6.
124.
See McKinstry, supra note 62, at 812.
125.
See e.g., SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2010); see also Calfee,
supra note 120, at 170-72.
126.
See e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
533 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (Tourre), 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co. 753 F. Supp 2d 166
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Calfee, supra note 120, at 173-76.
127.
See e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt., Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada,
732 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated, 645 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011); Calfee,
supra note 120, at 177.
128.
See He, supra note 112, at 176-77; Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Plumbers, 753 F.
Supp. 2d at 177.
129.
See He, supra note 112, at 176-77.
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While these factors are seemingly straightforward, courts have
never clarified the factors or circumstances in which a plaintiff can
succeed under this test. Rather, it seems that every time this method
is applied, the court deems the transaction foreign, pointing only to
factors that indicate that the transaction falls outside of Morrison's
purview. 130 For instance, two lower courts using the "irrevocable
liability" approach in cases with strikingly similar fact patterns
involving penny stocks reached opposite findings. 131 In Cascade Fund
LLP v. Absolute Capital Management, the court found a foreign
transaction when the plaintiff entity purchased foreign penny stocks
on the US OTC market. 132 The court argued that irrevocable liability
existed only when defendants accepted the application to invest while
in the Cayman Islands, not when money was transferred from the
United States. 133 Meanwhile, despite a similar fact pattern and
holding in Absolute Activist v. Ficeto, the court noted that "facts
concerning the formation of the contracts, the placement of purchase
orders, the passing of title, or the exchange of money" may indicate a
domestic transaction.1 34 This is in direct contention with the idea in
Cascade that transfer of money is insufficient. 135

II. ANALYZING THE LACK OF PROTECTION AFFORDED TO INVESTORS AND
ITS EFFECT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

As a result of the current regulatory regime and recent case
law, unsponsored ADRs fall through the cracks when it comes to
antifraud protection, leaving investors with no remedy from any
regime. This ultimately results in a failure to meet or an outright
contradiction of the overarching goals sought by the Morrison
opinion-predictability, international comity, and preservation of the
language and goals of the Securities and Exchange Acts. 136 In turn,
this lack of protection results in inefficiency in not just the US market,
but the global securities market. With advancements in technology
facilitating further interconnectedness of markets, something must be

130.
See Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159, Plumbers, 753 F.
Supp. 2d at 178.
131.
Compare Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.
2012), with Cascade Fund v. Absolute Capital Mgmt., 2011 No. 08-CV-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011
WL 1211511 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011).
132.

Cascade, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Absolute Activist, 798 F.3d at 70; Calfee, supra note 120, at 178.
See Cascade, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7.
See Chiappini, supra note 94, at 1822.
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done to avoid the global inefficiencies that could deter foreign trade
and interrupt the global economy.
A. Lack of Antifraud Protectionfor UnsponsoredADRs

The current regulatory regime allows unsponsored ADRs to fall
through the cracks when it comes to regulation, leaving investors
of any regime.
unprotected by the regulations
completely
Unsponsored ADRs escape antifraud liability because they are usually

considered foreign transactions under Morrison.137 Even if they fall
within the purview of Morrison, both foreign private issuers and
depositary banks would be absolved from issuer liability, 138 narrowing
the parties from whom injured plaintiffs can seek relief.
The discussion of Morrison and post-Morrison cases above

indicates that transactions with unsponsored ADRs would likely fall
outside of Morrison's purview. First, although treatment of sponsored
ADRs has been inconsistent, the recent cases that actually decided the
issue deemed them foreign transactions under Morrison.139 Second,
while the examination of off-exchange transactions provides little
guidance on how courts are applying Morrison, there seems to be a
general pattern toward considering transactions on the OTC market
as foreign transactions. 140 Finally, the most closely analogous case, In
re Societe Generale Securities Litigation, addressed ADRs trading on
the OTC market and concluded that these were foreign
in
despite some inconsistencies
Therefore,
transactions. 141
143
142
the cases that address ADRs,
applications of Morrison,

See, e.g., In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 CIV. 2495 RMB, 2010 WL
137.
3910286, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
See S. Rep. No. 379, at 29-31 (1963) ("As a practical matter, however, enforcement of
138.
the registration and reporting requirements of S. 1642 against foreign issuers outside the
jurisdiction of the United States who do not voluntarily seek funds in the American capital
markets or listing on an exchange would present serious difficulties. To prevent the securities of
such issuers from being traded in the U.S. markets would seriously affect American holders of
millions of dollars of such foreign securities."); Beyea, supra note 18, at 540; Saunders, supra
note 57, at 66.
See, e.g., In re Societe Generale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6.
139.
140.
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (Tourre), 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.
Supp 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
See In re Societe Generale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6.
141.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 553.
142.
See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D.N.Y.
143.
2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Societe
Generale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6; Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF
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off-exchange transactions, 144 and ADRs in off-exchange transactions
all imply that unsponsored ADRs would not be subject to Rule 10b-5
145
liability in the United States.
Even if Morrison were to apply to transactions involving
unsponsored ADRs, these securities would still escape Rule 10b-5
liability due to failure to identify a viable issuer from whom to seek
relief. 146 Rule 10b-5 claims are typically brought against the issuer. 147
While it is usually simple to determine the issuer in a given securities
transaction, this question becomes much more complicated in the
realm of unsponsored ADRs. While it is clear that the foreign
company issues the underlying security, it seems unfair to consider it
the issuer of unsponsored ADRs when it made no affirmative effort to
raise capital in the US market.1 48 A look at legislative history
confirms this intuition. 149 As discussed above, the SEC chose to
exempt ADRs from the additional reporting requirements of the 1964
amendments to the Securities Act and Exchange Act. 150 Also, the
SEC's constant application of rules specifically to FPIs who had
previously listed on US exchanges, such as Rules 10 and 14, shows an
explicit distinction between FPIs who demonstrated an active
intention to enter the US market from those who had not. 151 In other
words, drafting silence with regard to FPIs who had never previously
listed indicates an intent to exempt FPIs who had not voluntarily
chosen to list on the US markets from Sections 10 and 14 of the
Exchange Act. FPIs with unsponsored ADRs are FPls who have not
voluntarily chosen to enter the US market.1 52 Therefore, they could
not be subject to liability under Section 10 as the issuer. Also, as FPIs
play no role in selling these securities to consumers on the US OTC

(AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); see also Calfee, supra note 120, at
169-70.
144.

. See Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159; Plumbers, 753 F.

Supp 2d at 178.
145.

See In re Societe Generale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6.

146.

See Saunders, supra note 57, at 65-66.
See Beyea, supra note 18, at 554.

147.

148.
See S. Rep. No. 379, at 29-31 (1963) ("As a practical matter, however, enforcement
of the registration and reporting requirements of S. 1642 against foreign issuers outside the
jurisdiction of the United States who do not voluntarily seek funds in the American capital
markets or listing on an exchange would present serious difficulties. To prevent the securities of
such issuers from being traded in the U.S. markets would seriously affect American holders of
millions of dollars of such foreign securities.").
149.
See id.
150.

See BERSANI, supra note 44.

151.
Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066
(Apr. 28, 1967) (codified in Rule 12g3-2(b)).
152.
See Chiappini, supra note 94, at 1822.
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markets, 15 3 injured investors would likely fail in any attempt to bring
an action in the FPI's home country.
Since the FPI cannot be held liable as the issuer in a Rule
10b-5 suit, one might presume liability should fall to the depository
trust company that is responsible for the unsponsored ADRs listing on
15 4
the US OTC market. However, they escape issuer status as well.
As mentioned above, Form F-6 allows depositaries to create a fictitious
issuer of ADRs, making their role in the facilitation of unsponsored
155
ADRs purely ministerial and absolving them from liability.
Therefore, if a plaintiff injured by fraud with regard to his purchase of
an unsponsored ADR seeks relief under Rule 10b-5, there is no one
from whom to seek a remedy.
B. Far-ReachingEffects
Many argue that investors' inability to seek Rule 10b-5 relief
for fraud associated with unsponsored ADRs sold on the OTC market
is a just result. 156 Since those selling securities on the OTC market
typically do so because they cannot meet the SEC requirements to sell
on official markets, 157 it is presumed that trading on the OTC market
is inherently risky and that those who buy these securities are aware
of and comfortable with that risk.15 8 Also, the SEC's failure to require
registration or reporting from FPIs or depositary trust companies not
only indicates an intent to absolve them from liability,1 59 but also
further bolsters the assumption of risk by unsponsored ADR investors.
However, this reasoning ignores the fact that allowing unsponsored
ADRs to fall through the cracks is illogical with respect to the goals of
Morrison and the goals of securities regulation generally-and
negatively impacts the US and global economies alike.
1. Goals of Morrison Not Met
Morrison sought to create predictability, international comity,
and preserve the language and intent of the Exchange Act. 160 The
example of unsponsored ADRs demonstrates that the Morrison test

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 45.
See 17 C.F.R. § 239 (2015).
See Saunders, supra note 57, at 66.
See McKinstry, supra note 62, at 812-13.
See Dodd, supra note 60.

158.

See id.

159.
Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066
(Apr. 28, 1967) (codified in Rule 12g3-2(b)).
160.
See Chiappini, supra note 14, at 1822.
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has, in fact, failed to meet these goals. An examination of lower
courts' application of Morrison to ADRs of all kinds immediately
demonstrates Morrison's failure to create a predictable test. 161 The
Morrison Court only provided guidance with regard to foreign-cubed
transactions, making it extremely difficult for lower courts to apply
the test in all other transactions with foreign elements. 162 Also, in
attempting to apply this test in a bright-line predictable fashion, lower
courts have moved closer and closer to dismissing all cases involving
off-exchange transactions instead of grappling with their complicated
16 3
and intricate nature.
Morrison's international comity goal emanates from an
aversion to imposing duplicative or conflicting regulations, forcibly
imposing US law in other countries, or interfering with foreign
markets in any way.1 64 However, this goal must be balanced with the
165
desire to facilitate global investment in an interconnected world.
For all of the reasons discussed above, global investment is extremely
beneficial and mutually desired by issuers, investors, and individual
countries alike.1 66
However, the Morrison test, while strongly
adhering to its international comity goal, goes too far and may
actually deter foreign investment. The test, coupled with other
regulatory apparatuses, leaves investors in unsponsored ADRs
completely unprotected from the laws of any regime. Due to this lack
of relief for investors, unsponsored ADRs may become risky to a point
that will deter most rational investors. 167
Since increased
globalization of securities is inevitable and unsponsored ADRs form
one of the most common means of foreign investment, some argue that
continued regulatory sovereignty is infeasible in today's economy. 168

161.
See Calfee, supra note 120, at 162.
162.
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (Tourre), 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp 2d
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Societe
Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 CIV. 2495 RMB, 2010 WL 3910286, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1-2
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); Beyea, supra note 18, at 554; He, supra note 112, at 150-51.
163.
See Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159, Plumbers, 753 F.
Supp 2d at 178.
164.
See Chiappini, supra note 14, at 1822.
165.
See Cox, supra note 13, at 953-54; Marano, supra note 34; Licht, supra note 34, at
142-43, 145.
166.
See Cox, supra note 13, at 984-86.
167.
See id.
168.
See Cox, supra note 13, at 978.

2016] UNSPONSORED ADRs FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS

871

Nonetheless, extremely complicated global regulatory regimes that
might diminish the effectiveness of foreign investment must be
avoided.169
Finally, the Morrison test arguably adheres to the language of
the Exchange Act because the Act is silent regarding extraterritorial
reach. 170 However, its application in the unsponsored ADR context
demonstrates that it does not align with the Securities and Exchange
Acts. While Congress did grant the SEC authority to exempt certain
foreign securities from registration, 17 1 legislative history indicates that
investors in ADR instruments should be protected.172
Also,
unsponsored ADRs look and operate much differently than most
unsophisticated securities that typically trade on the OTC market.
Unsponsored ADRs represent interests in sophisticated foreign
companies, and their prices are more or less efficient because they are
traded at roughly the same price as similar securities traded in other
foreign markets. 173 Because of these attributes, which make them
resemble more sophisticated securities, potential investors will be
more likely to trust these investments despite their lack of
registration and reporting requirements. Therefore, failure to protect
investors in unsponsored ADRs seems to directly violate the goals of
the Securities and Exchange Acts. This argument is strengthened by
the fact that the nearly identical, yet less dangerous, sponsored ADRs
traded on the OTC market are susceptible to Rule 10b-5 liability. 174
2. Deterring a Long-Term Problem
As established above, the securities regulations were instituted
in the United States in order for the securities market to function

169.
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170.
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171.
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172.
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most efficiently and effectively. 175 Since unsponsored ADRs are
escaping the regulations of any country, the resulting inefficiencies
will reach past the US market into the global securities market,
176
creating a continuous, growing, long-term issue.
Integration of the world's securities markets may be a
relatively recent phenomenon, but it is not one that is going to cease
or reverse anytime soon. 177 Unfortunately, the existing US regulatory
scheme was instituted more than eighty years ago in the context of a
domestic securities market. 178 Its drafters neither contemplated this
state of the world nor could have created a system to anticipate it.
Today, however, technology allows the securities market to operate at
a global level. 179 As a natural result, transnational securities fraud
has become more prominent, leading to escalated litigation and
demands for investor protection in this area.18 0 In a world desperately
in need of securities regulation reform,18 1 some consider the Morrison
18 2
decision a "major step back for ... investors around the world."
III. USING EXISTING DTC FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT INVESTORS AND
HOLD FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR FRAUDULENT
ACTIVITY

This Note proposes a solution for the lack of protection of
unsponsored ADRs in the US marketplace which aims to clear up
confusion regarding liability in the unsponsored ADR realm and to
ensure better promotion of the goals of Morrison and the Securities
and Exchange Acts in today's global security market. It involves using
the existing technology and infrastructure of the Depository Trust
Company (DTC) to protect investors. The DTC provides an existing
infrastructure that streamlines trade of a wide variety of securities
traded both domestically and abroad.18 3 Since the DTC was created
for the purposes of reducing costs, risks, and inefficiencies in the trade
175.
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of securities, it is the perfect institution for organizing the trade of
unsponsored ADRs.1 m
Since issuers and investors have traded
through the DTC for over forty years, both are familiar with its
functionality.18 5 Since the DTC system already exists and works with
unsponsored ADRs,18 6 this solution should not be exceedingly costly or
difficult to implement.
However, use of the DTC to institute these solutions raises
18 7
several issues. First, the DTC is not a regulatory apparatus.
Rather, it is a company that has stepped in to create infrastructure
and holding facilities to eliminate reliance on paper in the securities
market.188 Therefore, uncertainties arise as to whether it can also
serve the legal function set forth by this solution. However, the DTC
was created in response to the legislative call for action set forth in 15
U.S.C. 78(q).18 9 Since it has served as a solution to a legal issue in the
past, 190 certainly it should be able to promote a similar initiative now.
Also, the DTC works regularly with regulators. 191 This solution would
simply be another project for DTC and regulator collaboration.
Presuming the preliminary issues listed above can be
overcome, this Note proposes that the DTC implement one of the
following technological functions into its system as a solution to the
issues detailed in Part II: (a) institute a function that prevents
unsponsored ADR from trading in the United States; (b) institute an
alert system which notifies investors of the risks associated with
investment in unsponsored ADRs; or (c) institute an alert system that
notifies issuers that unsponsored ADRs associated with their company
are trading on the US market.
A. Field UnsponsoredADRs
Since the DTC's
processing of securities

184.
185.

infrastructure
deposits, 192 it

provides for centralized
could create a function
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disallowing all unsponsored ADRs from entry and withdrawal from its
system. In other words, due to the inherent risk of unsponsored
ADRs, the DTC could prevent their trade altogether.
This function would fulfill the goals of Morrison. Morrison's
application to unsponsored ADRs would be predictable because trade
of unsponsored ADRs would have few, if any, connection to the United
States. The removal of trade via the DTC, a huge domestic component
of these transactions, would remove much of the confusion
surrounding whether trade of unsponsored ADRs should be deemed
foreign or domestic. Also, as established by Stackhouse, the fact that a
purchaser is located in the United States while the transaction occurs
is insufficient to establish a Rule 10b-5 claim. 193 With this solution, it
would be difficult for foreign securities to reach the US market
without the FPI's knowledge. This would provide investors with a
clear issuer to sue under Rule 10b-5 in situations where a transaction
had sufficient ties to the United States to pass Morrison. Similarly,
international comity would be preserved since these transactions will
not be considered actionable under Rule 10b-5 in the United States.
Finally, preventing the trade of unsponsored ADRs on the DTC
provides strict investor protection as investors are denied the most
convenient form of trading these instruments. This solution further
eliminates investor confusion by preventing multiple depositary
institutions establish unsponsored ADR programs for the same
company, allowing for consistent shareholder services. 194
However, due to this solution's near-complete elimination of
the trade of unsponsored ADRs in the United States, it raises several
issues. Since more than 815 unsponsored ADR programs were traded
in 2014 alone, 195 this solution appears to stifle a huge sector of
international securities trade, something that is universally desired.196
Nonetheless, even if this solution did have the effect of reducing
international securities trade, this reduction would be temporary.
Once the market adapted to the system, the universal desire for
international securities trade would find a way to work within this
framework. In fact, a temporary hit to the market is justifiable when
the outcome is a more globally efficient market. Also, instead of
stifling securities trade, it may instead allow for the market to adjust
to a more efficient model. Disallowing unsponsored ADR trade on the
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DTC might force a legal relationship between the depositary and the
issuer. 197 This would likely allow injured investors to bring cause of
action against both the issuer and the depositary institution.
Second, while it will provide more US investors in foreign
securities with protection, there is a chance that investors in
unsponsored ADRs that manage to reach the United States without
use of the DTC will still remain remediless in the event of fraud.
Overcoming this obstacle might be impossible without adjustments to
the existing securities regime. However, perhaps the "assumption of
risk" argument expressed above 198 would be more appropriate to apply
to unsponsored ADRs not trading on the DTC if this regime existed.
Since most investors are familiar with the DTC and know of its
sophistication and legitimacy, it is more reasonable to assume
investors know that securities that do not trade through the DTC are
inherently risky than to assume that investors consider any
unsponsored ADR risky.
B. Alert Investors of Risks Associated with UnsponsoredADRs
The DTC could adopt a simple alert system used in the trade of
unsponsored ADRs that would alert and inform investors of the risks
of investing in these instruments and direct them to information that
would better inform their decision-making regarding these trades.
Trades are completed electronically through the DTC. If investors
make a trade, they could be alerted before completion of the trade to
consider the risks associated with investing in an unsponsored ADR,
such as likely failure to bring suit under Rule 10b-5. The alert could
be simple, but contain easy-to-follow links to detailed information
about the risks involved. If a broker completes the trade for an
investor, a similar alert could be directed toward the broker requiring
the broker to inform investors or provide requisite information to
investors to apprise them of the risks before the transaction is
completed.
This solution fits neatly with the existing state of the law. It
will allow continuation of the trend of post-Morrison, considering
unsponsored
ADRs
"foreign transactions,"
while
providing
predictability, international comity, and fulfilling the goals of the
Securities and Exchange Acts. It creates predictability for both
issuers and investors. Issuers will be certain that they will not face
Rule 10b-5 liability, and investors will be certain that they are making
197.
See DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 3.
198.
See Dodd, supra note 60 (suggesting that investors in unsponsored ADRs should be
aware of their inherent risk).
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a risky investment. This promotes international comity by preventing
the United States from overstepping its authority by reaching into US
markets. Finally, although it still prevents the ability to bring Rule
10b-5 liability under Morrison, it provides investor protection
demanded by the Securities and Exchange Acts.
This solution
protects and informs investors of the risks inherent in investing in
unsponsored securities.
Instead of assuming that investors are
completely aware of these risks by virtue of investment, this solution
ensures that they have received actual notice of these risks. While it
is unlikely that all investors will read or fully consider the information
regarding these risks, this solution creates much more protection than
the existing system. Also, the SEC has repeatedly viewed the mere
availability of information sufficient to protect investors. 199
Similar to the first solution, this could significantly reduce the
use of unsponsored ADRs. Alerting investors of the risks associated
with investing in these securities will deter risk-averse investors. As
established above, however, this reduction would likely be temporary
and will cease to exist when the market adjusts to the change. Even if
it does not reduce or eliminate unsponsored ADRs, it will slow the
process of their trade. However, this is a small price to pay for
increasing global market efficiency and investor protection. Finally,
this solution may not clarify from whom an injured investor may seek
relief.

C. Alert Foreign Companies that UnsponsoredADRs Are Trading in
US Market
A third solution requires the DTC to alert foreign companies of
US trade of unsponsored ADRs representing interests in their
companies. When an unsponsored ADR is first deposited into the
DTC, the foreign company would be notified. This would eliminate
foreign companies' arguments that they are absolved from liability
due to lack of "voluntary" entry into the market. 20 0 This will allow
these companies a chance to improve the information they make

199.
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200.
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available or attempt to step in and remove the unsponsored ADRs
from the US market.
This solution creates more predictability by informing foreign
companies of their securities entry into the US market specifically.
This creates the potential for investor relief through Rule 10b-5
liability since foreign issuers can no longer argue involuntary entry
into the market. On the other hand, it may create less predictability
since, unlike solution (b), the question of whether unsponsored ADRs
are considered foreign or domestic under Morrison is left unresolved.
This solution promotes international comity because the DTC only
alerts foreign companies of those unsponsored ADRs that have
entered the US market. Since the DTC would only alert foreign
companies of potential liability with regard to "securities traded on
the US market," as set forth by the statute, it is not overstepping into
regulation of securities traded abroad. The goals of the Securities and
Exchange Acts also seem protected as this solution clearly identified
whom an injured investor can sue. It promotes dissemination of
information that, in turn, creates more accurate pricing of these
securities. This solution will positively impact the efficiency of both
the domestic and global marketplaces.

D. How to Proceed
Considering the three possible solutions presented above, the
most effective way to remedy the issues presented by unsponsored
ADRs is to use the DTC to both alert investors and foreign companies.
Instituting these two ideas in concert will slightly alter their effect in
an optimal way. Instead of leaving investors to absorb all of the risk,
as the "Alert Investors" solution requires, or leaving investors
uninformed, as the "Alert Foreign Companies" solution may entail,
investors will be aware of the riskiness associated with these
instruments while maintaining the ability to seek remedy from foreign
investors. This will provide the most protection to investors while
apprising issuers that unsponsored ADRs representing interests in
their companies are trading in the United States. As a result, the
process of buying and selling unsponsored ADRs moves closer to the
ideal trading atmosphere envisioned by the Securities and Exchange
Acts, where investors are protected by access to information and the
ability to seek remedy in the event of fraudulent activity by the issuer.
Unlike the "Fielding All Unsponsored ADRs" solution, this
strategy does not immediately annihilate the trade of unsponsored
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ADRs, but allows the market to adjust to issuer and investor
awareness of the risks associated with unsponsored ADRs more
gradually. This will allow the marketplace to come to an efficient
equilibrium over time without drastically disrupting efficiency or
global trade generally. Since continuing globalization of the securities
market is inevitable, this strategy allows for the legal regime to catch
up with technology in a seamless and efficient fashion.
IV. CONCLUSION
While many changes must be made before the securities
market can function seamlessly at a global level, this solution allows
for a huge step in the right direction. By using the DTC to field
unsponsored ADR investments altogether, alert investors of
unsponsored ADRs' inherent risks, or alert foreign companies of the
trading of unsponsored ADRs representing their shares-or a
combination of the three-not only will unsponsored ADRs receive
more regulatory attention, but also the global marketplace will
function at a much more efficient level.
Perhaps someday securities regulations or infrastructure like
the DTC can function at a global level, which would likely solve many
of the issues discussed in this Note by facilitating global trade in a
market that is accountable, information-rich, and efficient. However,
a solution of that magnitude will require global collaboration, which
could take years to (or might never) occur. In the meantime, this
solution allows for a huge step in the direction of a securities market
that can function seamlessly at a global level.
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